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ABSTRACT 
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus program is a powerful force management tool 
designed to increase retention in undermanned skills.  This thesis analyzes many of the 
theoretical applications of alternative compensation methods, specifically auctions, 
signaling theory, and experimental economics; and explains how an economic 
experiment might be applied within the Department of Defense.  This experimental 
approach presents service members a certain scenario which mirrors a choice they might 
face when posed with a retention decision.  Economic experiments are an inexpensive 
way to make more informed personnel policy decisions.  This thesis postulates that 
economic experiments are an excellent means to capture the human element in the 
decision-making process.  Additionally, economic experiments provide another form of 
simulation to “wind-tunnel” test policy changes before implementing them across the 
services.  The sample experiment discussed in this thesis combines the theoretical 
principles of both auction and signaling theory and provides a means to analyze concrete 
data for which the Department of Defense could use before actually conducting an 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES  
While the United States military relies heavily on the effective use of technology, 
weapon systems, and logistics, the most critical component of the military is the 
individual airmen, soldier, sailor or marine.  All branches of service in the United States 
military must continue to attract and retain competent personnel.  Therefore, the military 
must further develop appropriate personnel policies and procedures to maximize the 
effectiveness of the programs geared toward attracting and retaining those personnel with 
the necessary and critical skills. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to incur increasing costs associated 
with personnel programs; specifically in the Selective Reenlistment Bonus program.  
Additionally, in recent fiscal years Congress has appropriated less money than the 
services have requested for the Selective Reenlistment Bonus program.1  While 
reenlistment bonuses are only a small portion of the military’s total manpower 
expenditures, it is certainly an area that warrants attention because of the enormous 
impact it can have on service member’s individual retention decision.  Consequently, 
these retention decisions have a direct impact on latter costs the military incurs especially 
in the areas of education, training, and recruitment. 
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus program is a force management tool designed 
to increase retention in undermanned or poorly retained skills.  The program serves two 
basic purposes:  to provide incentives to keep existing members in critical skills and to 
entice other, less critical, skills to retrain into career fields receiving selective 
reenlistment bonus payments.  In general, each service uses the Selective Reenlistment 
Bonus program to address poor retention and manpower inventory shortages in critical 
skills. 
There has been a great deal of theoretical research dedicated toward creating new 
incentives that would effectively attract and retain critical skills in the military.  
                                                 
1 United States General Accounting Office, “Military Personnel:  DoD Needs More Effective Controls 
to Better Assess the Progress of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program.” GAO-04-86, November 2003, 
3. 
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However, before the DoD can commit to alternative compensation methods, it must 
thoroughly research how military members might respond to them.  The purpose of this 
thesis is two-fold:  it analyzes many of the theoretical applications of alternative 
compensation methods, specifically auctions and signaling theory; and it explains how an 
economic experiment might be applied wherein service members respond to a certain 
scenario which mirrors a choice they might face when posed with a retention decision.  
Applying this experimental approach will provide the DoD with better information as to 
how service members respond to these important retention decisions.  In turn, the DoD 
can use this information to determine if the current reenlistment compensation policies 
warrant change. 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Just like many Fortune 500 firms and other large corporations, the DoD must 
constantly reevaluate and assess the personnel and compensation policies governing 
incentive packages for service members.  Reassessing the current incentive structure 
allows the DoD the flexibility to better cope with changes in the existing labor market.  
While it is inconceivable to postulate that there is a “perfect” incentive structure, 
exploring new avenues will allow the DoD to better compete for and retain its valuable 
labor resources.  This research addresses new avenues to compensate service members. 
 
1. Primary Question 
How might a second priced sealed bid auction provide the DoD with a cost 
effective alternative for calculating enlistment bonuses, while retaining quality military 
personnel? 
 
2. Secondary Questions 
To fully address the primary question, several secondary questions will have to be 
answered in the development of this thesis.  These questions include the relevant issues 
concerning retention and the current selective reenlistment bonus program; basic 
compensation practices; potential improvements through different types of auctions; 
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analysis of economic experiments and the feasibility of incorporating the results into a 
manageable selective reenlistment bonus program for the DoD. 
 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis focuses on the broad compensation practices within the DoD.  It does 
not address the specific compensation policies or selective reenlistment bonus programs 
within each service.  While each service has a unique methodology to implementing their 
respective selective reenlistment bonus program, this research can be applied to all 
services because it does not interfere with the fundamental goal of the selective 
reenlistment bonus program; to attract and retain critical skills.     
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis consists of a literature review that motivates a conceptual model and 
coupled with a description and justification for an economic experiment to test the model.  
This thesis uses academic literature to address the possibility of applying auction and 
signaling theory to alternative compensation practices in the DoD.  These theories can 
then be tested using an economic experiment to predict the possible responses service 
members may give when faced with a retention decision.  While the academic and 
military communities have conducted a great deal of research on auction and signaling 
theory, the arena of experimental economics remains yet untapped.  The author proposes 
that through experimental economics the DoD can conduct additional research to capture 
the human element of a service member’s retention decision before implementing an 
















































A. AUCTION DEFINED 
Before addressing why the military should study auctions, it is important to first 
define what an auction is, review some of the terminology related to auctions and discuss 
the basic types of auctions.  An auction is “a market institution with an explicit set of 
rules to determine resource allocation and prices based on the bids from market 
participants.”2  This definition has three critical elements.  First, an auction is a “market 
institution.”  In other words, an auction is a mechanism or structure where two or more 
individuals come together.  Second, an auction has “an explicit set of rules to determine 
resource allocation.”  This aspect of the definition implies that the individuals behave 
under a specific, clear, or detailed set of laws or norms within this market.  Lastly, the 
“prices (in auctions) are based on the bids of market participants.”  Simply stated, the 
numerical, monetary value of goods or services is based on the offers of the individuals 
within the market. 
 
B. COMMON TERMINOLOGY 
Auctions can vary by location, format, or the rules that govern them.  However, as 
the aforementioned definition highlighted, there are common terms to every auction.  
These terms stem from the participants and their respective roles in an auction.  In any 
auction, these participants are sellers and buyers.  A seller is one who has a good or 
service that they are willing to provide for a certain price.  The buyer is one seeking to 
purchase the good or service from the seller.  Often participants are labeled bidders and 
bid-takers.  A bidder is person or agency competing against one another for the winning 
price.  A bid-taker is a person or agency that receives the offers submitted by the bidders. 
The most familiar auction is one whereby several buyers compete for a good or 
service that a single seller is willing to provide.  This auction is also known as a forward 
auction.  The types of goods or services sold in these auctions include, but are not limited 
to, artwork, antiques, agricultural products, and precious metals.  In a forward auction, 
                                                 
2 R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan.  “Auctions and Bidding.”  Journal of Economic Literature 
Vol. XXV, June 1987, 699-738. 
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the winning bidder is the one who is willing to pay the seller the highest price for the 
good or service.  Another type of auction, the reverse auction, is the inverse of a forward 
auction.  In a reverse auction, a single buyer chooses a good or service from a multitude 
of sellers.  Each seller competes for that one buyer’s business and the winner is the seller 
willing to sell their good or service at the lowest cost to the buyer.  Reverse auctions are 
prevalent in government service or purchasing contracts. 
Since in a forward auction there is only one seller, he or she is often labeled a 
monopolist, because he or she is the sole person (or agency) on that side of the exchange.  
In a reverse auction, a buyer is often referred to as a monopsonist for the same reason.  
On the surface it appears that the auction host has an advantage, because they set the 
rules.  However, there are instances where the monopolist or monopsonist might have a 
disadvantage.  As this thesis will later discuss in greater detail, the overarching reason to 
conduct an auction is based upon an asymmetric information environment.  In other 
words, one party in an exchange of a good or service knows something relevant about the 
transaction and the other party does not possess the same degree of knowledge. 
Information in an auction is crucial, especially when trying to ascertain the value 
of a good or service that is to be auctioned.  The different values bidders place on an item 
can arise from two specific instances.  In the first example, suppose a building contractor 
is competing against other contractors to build an office park for a corporation.  The 
builder knows precisely how much it will cost him, thus he knows the true value of the 
contract to him.  The building contractor does not know how much the project will cost 
his competitors; thus he does not know the value they place on the contract.  The building 
contractor can only guess that another bidder’s valuation is based on a range of probable 
values.  Similarly, the building contractor knows that the other bidders regard his value of 
the contract to fall within the same range of probable values.  This example is called an 
independent-private-values model, because the value each bidder places on the good or 
service is independent from any other bidder’s valuation.   
The second instance where bidders can assign different values is the common 
value model.  The model is often illustrated with the auctioning of an antique.  If several 
dealers bid for an antique, there is a single, accepted value for the antique.  That objective 
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value is the price it will fetch when later purchased from the dealer.  In this case, the 
missing information is the fact that no knows its true value, because that purchase has not 
happened, yet.  Since the dealers have access to different information, they have different 
guesses as to how much the antique is truly worth.  As a result, the dealers will adjust 
their bid for the antique based on the bids of other dealers. 
In the antique example above the value bidders place on the antique is implicit, 
but bidders have a means of expressing the value they place on the item in the course of 
the auction by using a reservation price.  A reservation price is the price below or above 
which the bidder is unwilling to go.  In other words, in a forward auction, it is the 
maximum a buyer is willing to pay for an item.  The opposite is true in a reverse auction.  
In a reverse auction, the reservation price is the minimum price a seller is willing to 
accept for the item.  Since auctions rely heavily on information or a lack of information, 
sellers and buyers must decide whether they should make their reservation price known.  
This decision is crucial to the design of the auction.  If the antique seller announces a 
reserve price, prospective bidders may focus or center their bids on this price; thus 
potentially denying the seller the maximum amount of economic rent exchanged in the 
transaction.  Bidders revealing their reservation price may be out-bid by other bidders. 
 
C. TYPES OF AUCTIONS 
There are four basic types of auctions:  ascending-bid, descending-bid, first-price 
sealed bid, and second-price sealed bid.  Each type differs by location, design, and the set 
of rules employed.  The next section briefly describes these types. 
  
1.   Ascending-bid Auctions 
The ascending-bid auction is the most commonly recognized type of auction.  
Ascending-bid auctions are also known as oral, open, or English auctions.  In an 
ascending-bid auction, bidders increase their offered price for a good or service until one 
bidder pays the proposed price.  The bidder that reaches this point wins the good or 
service and is said to have won the auction.  The fundamental principles and rules in an 
oral auction remain relatively constant.  However, the process by which the bidders 
announce or make their bids known may be vastly different.  Some auctions employ an 
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auctioneer to solicit price increases or declare the current offer.  In some auctions, bidders 
announce their bids aloud or submit them in written form.  Other types of ascending-bid 
auctions may be held electronically.  Despite the format used in ascending bid auctions, 
the bidders know the current high bid for the good or service. 
 
2.   Descending-bid Auctions 
Descending-bid auctions are also known as Dutch auctions.  In a descending-bid 
auction, an auctioneer proposes an initial price for a good or service.  As the auction 
progresses, the price decreases incrementally until a bidder is willing to pay the price he 
or she desires and subsequently making this desire known to all auction participants.  
Descending-bid auctions are similar to ascending-bid auctions in that prospective bidders 
know the current asking price of the good or service.  Dutch auctions originated in the 
Netherlands when markets would auction cut flowers.3 
 
3.   First-price Sealed Bid Auctions 
In a first-price sealed bid auction, prospective buyers do not know the bids of 
competing bidders.  Bids are sealed with the winning bidder submitting the highest price 
for the good or service.  The good or service is then sold to that buyer at their bid price.  
The format for first-price sealed bid auctions differs from ascending or descending-bid 
auctions in two key areas.  First, bidders have only one opportunity to submit their bid for 
the good or service.  Second, they have no knowledge about the bids other prospective 
buyers submit.  The Department of Defense and other government agencies use first-
price sealed bid auctions in procurement contracts such as privatized housing projects.4 
 
4.   Second-price Sealed Bid Auctions 
Second-price sealed bid auctions are similar to first-price sealed bid auctions.  In 
both types of auctions, bidders submit sealed bids and have no knowledge about the bids 
of competing buyers.  Second-price sealed bid auctions are also known as Vickery 
auctions.  The difference between first and second-price sealed bid auctions is in the price 
                                                 
3 R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan. “Auctions and Bidding.” Journal of Economic Literature 
Vol. XXV, June 1987, 699-738. 
4 Ibid. 
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the winning bidder pays for the good or service.  In first-price sealed bid auctions, the 
winner submitted the highest bid and paid an amount equal to the bid; thus he or she paid 
the highest price for the good or service among all competing bidders.  In a Vickery 
auction, the winning bidder submitted the highest bid, but only paid a price equal to the 
second highest bid for the good or service.  In other words, the winning bidder pays the 
price that the second place or first losing bidder submitted. 
Auction theorists hold that the best or optimal bidding strategy in second-price 
sealed bid auctions is for participants to submit bids that reflect what they individually 
perceive as the true value for the good or service.  In practice, however, Vickery auctions 
are seldom used and participants tend to inflate their bid in an effort to win the good or 
service while still paying a lower price than the one they submitted.  This thesis purposes 
an economic experiment to explore this hypothesis. 
 
D. COMPARING AUCTIONS 
Deciding which of the four types of simple auctions to use can be based on a host 
of factors.  However, it is important to note that auction theorists conclude:  “each of 
these auctions forms yields on average the same revenue to the seller.”5  This statement 
does not imply that the outcomes of the four auctions are exactly same.  Additionally, 
although all four types yield the same price on average, there are practical differences.  In 
both an ascending-bid and a second-price sealed bid auction, the bidder can determine 
how high they intend to bid.  In an ascending-bid auction, bidders remain in the bidding 
competition until the price for the good or service reaches his or her perceived value.  In a 
second-price sealed bid auction, bidders submit bids equal to their perceived value of the 
good or service.  On the other hand, in a descending bid and first-price sealed bid auction, 
bidders submit bidders which are less than their perceived value.  How much less is 
dependent upon what each bidder perceives as the range of possible bids competing 
bidders will submit.  This range is often termed the probability distribution of other 
bidders.6 
                                                  
5 Preston McAfee and John McMillan. “Auctions and Bidding.” Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 
XXV, June 1987, 699-738. 
6 Ibid. 
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E. WHERE AND WHY SHOULD THE MILITARY USE AUCTIONS? 
While the military uses reverse auctions for large purchase contracts, it should use 
auctions in a variety of other areas and for several important reasons.  This section 
explores alternative applications for auctions in the military, explains these reasons in 
detail, and discusses some limitations auctions present. 
 
1.   Alternative Applications 
 
a.   Selective Reenlistment Bonuses 
The military can apply reverse auctions to alternative compensation 
systems such as the Selective Reenlistment Bonus wherein enlisted military members 
with critical skills sell their labor to a single buyer, the seller’s respective branch of 
service (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps).  An auction of this nature would most 
certainly require a specific format.  Considering that military members are stationed 
throughout the world, an open auction, even on-line, would be almost impossible.  
Additionally, such an auction would present numerous technological challenges which 
may ultimately render the auction cost-prohibitive. 
The best format for implementing an auction for the Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus program would be either a first or second-price sealed bid auction.  
This format would allow bidders to submit their bid over a set, predetermined time period 
and give each person the greatest degree of flexibility.  A sealed bid auction would allow 
each service to select the number of personnel that are eligible for reenlistment 
considering the critical skills needed for any career field with a shortage in those critical 
skills.  The military could, in turn, use this number to determine the number of auction 
“winners.”  In a first-price sealed bid auction for selective reenlistments, each service 
member would receive a bonus equal to the price that he or she bid.  This type of auction 
might result in reenlistment eligible personnel of the same rank and career field receiving 
different bonuses. 
DoD could also implement a second-price sealed bid auction for the 
selective reenlistment bonus program.  Theoretically, a second-price sealed bid auction 
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would yield the same results (on average).  As the buyer, the military would pay the 
auction winners a bonus equal to the amount that the first losing bid. 
  
b.   Voluntary Separation Incentive 
Often to meet end strength levels mandated by Congress, the services 
enact various voluntary separation programs which offer incentives to both officers and 
enlisted members who voluntarily leave the service.  To increase the likelihood of 
meeting their end strength target, services historically offer an incentive.  Just as the 
Selective Reenlistment Bonus program, an auction under this initiative would require a 
specific format; most likely a first or second-price sealed bid auction. 
 
c.   Officer Specialties 
Currently each service offers a bonus to officers in specialized career 
fields that are undermanned.  A few examples include Navy surface warfare officers, Air 
Force pilots, and Medical Service Corps officers in the Army.  Similar to the Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus program, the military could hold a first or second-price sealed bid 
auction to retain their desired number of officers in these critically manned career fields.  
 
2.  Reasons for Implementing Auctions 
One reason to use auctions rather than traditional fixed priced methods is because 
some goods and services do not have a standard value.  The military is no different.  The 
value of the individual soldier, sailor, or airmen’s labor does not have a standard value.  
The price for this labor depends on both supply and demand conditions at a specific 
moment in time.  If supply of computer repair technicians in the military is low and the 
military has a need for computer repair technicians, the price the military is willing to pay 
for this labor may be high.  The reverse is also true.  If the supply is high and the demand 
is low, the price the military is willing to pay for a computer repair technician’s labor 
may be low. 
Another reason why the military should implement auctions is because auctions 
help find the “right” price for a particular good or service.  Auctions help find the “right” 
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price because they set the minimum price for those service members who want to be 
retained.  For example in the Selective Reenlistment Bonus program, if a service member 
bids above what the military (as the buyer) is willing to pay for labor in that critical skill, 
then the service member would not be retained.   
 
3.  Auction Limitations 
Apart from the technological and logistical challenges they create, auctions have 
some fundamental limitations.  There are instances where auctions may not necessarily 
translate into cost savings.  Continuing with the Selective Reenlistment Bonus program 
example, auctions will not result in significant savings to the military for those who 
would have reenlisted anyway (without a bonus).  The reasoning behind this statement is 
evident in fact that an auction provides a service member a forum to bid some amount, 
even if it is small.  A service member who would have reenlisted with no bonus, has no 
incentive to submit a “zero” bid for his or her labor.  If given the opportunity, which an 
auction creates, this person will most certainly submit a positive bid to provide the person 
with the maximum possible surplus without pricing him or her out of the market. 
Another limitation of auctions relates to the information or lack of information 
garnered from its participants.  At the conclusion of an auction, it is difficult to determine 
the driving factors or forces which cause a buyer or seller to act in a certain manner.  
Keeping with the Selective Reenlistment Bonus example, an auction does not bring to 
light any behavioral differences in the auction winners.  By way of an auction, if the 
military were to selectively reenlist only those service members who bid under $10,000, 
the military would not be able to compare a person who bid $500 against a person who 
bid up to the $10,000 cap.  Because both bidders bid under the reservation price, they 
both would “win” the auction and thus be reenlisted.  However, the difference between 
these two service members is transparent to the auction process.  The military could 
actively seek this information out via a post-auction survey, but prior to the auction they 
would have no indication as to how these bidders might behave.  The next chapter 





As evident in the previous chapter, one of the fundamental elements of auction 
theory is the idea that auctions create an environment with asymmetric information.  In 
the buying and selling of a good or service, one party has better or more information than 
the other.  One party is informed and the other uninformed.  Often in auctions, sellers do 
not know how much buyers might be willing to pay for a good or service and buyers do 
not know what their competitors may be willing to bid.  There is another theory often 
applied to combating asymmetric transactions:  Signaling Theory.  The premise behind 
signaling theory states that in an asymmetric environment, there may be other observable 
indicators of a hidden characteristic which may reveal the informed person’s intentions.7 
There are two ways uninformed parties can gain more information about the 
informed parties prior to a transaction:  screening and self-selection.  Based on the signals 
the informed party transmits, uninformed parties in a transaction can set up a device, or 
screen that sorts the informed parties.  While screening may not reveal the true nature of 
the informed party’s intention, it is one way to differentiate two or more parties so the 
uninformed party is less uninformed. 
The second way uninformed parties can gather more information about informed 
parties is through a self-selection device.  A self-selection device is “a mechanism in 
which an informed party…is offered a set of options, and the choice made by the 
informed party reveals his or her hidden characteristic (or signal).”8  This mechanism 
may be as simple as giving the informed party a choice between two options.  This 
chapter explores examples of signaling in various markets, limitations of signaling and 
how the DoD can use signaling to be a more informed decision-maker. 
                                                 
7 Michael L. Katz and Harvey S. Rosen.  Microeconomics, Boston, MA:  The McGraw Hill Compan 
Ibid.ies, Inc., 1998, 553-591. 
8 Ibid. 
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B. MARKET SIGNALING 
 
1.   Labor Market 
Michael Spence was one of first theorists to term “market signaling.”  In this 1974 
book, Market Signaling:  Information Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening 
Processes, Spence noted signaling can be used in the competitive market for labor; 
specifically between an employer and a prospective employee.  Before hiring a new 
employee, an employer has little information about the prospective employee on which to 
base their hiring decision.  This situation creates an environment with asymmetric 
information with the employer being the uniformed party and the prospective employee 
being the informed party.  Even after the employee is hired, asymmetric information 
persists, because an employee’s productivity may be unknown to the employer for some 
time.  Therefore, employers need a better way to distinguish between job applicants.  
Spence wrote that employers might base their hiring decision on two factors:  indices and 
signals.  Indices are characteristics which the prospective employee can not change, such 
as age and gender.  Signals on the other hand are characteristics which may be controlled 
by the applicant, but require some “costly action” or investment.9 
Education is an example of a signal often used in the labor market.  A prospective 
employee who invests time, effort, and money into his or her education sends a signal to 
an employer that they possess the necessary skills for employment, because education 
requires perseverance and a certain degree of intelligence.  These qualities mark a highly 
productive worker, as well as a successful student.  A person who believes the cost of an 
education is greater than the benefit it may yield will most likely seek a lower-paying job.  
Education is a way prospective employees differentiate themselves and employers can 
use the information from the signals applicants put forth to make better hiring decisions. 
 
2.   Used Car Market 
Another market with asymmetric information often used to observe signals is the 
market for used automobiles.  In his 1970 article “The Market for ‘Lemons’:  Quality, 
                                                 
9 Michael Spence. “Job Market Signaling.”  The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 87, No. 3, 
August 1973, 355-374. 
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Uncertainty, and the Market Mechanism,” George Akerlof discussed how a prospective 
buyer of a used car is an uninformed party and the dealer is the informed party.10  In this 
market, used car buyers cannot distinguish between high and low-quality cars (lemons).  
While a buyer can get some information by inspecting the car or taking it for a test drive, 
this is not enough information to accurately determine whether the car is of high or low-
quality.  On the other hand, the dealer (seller) has considerably more knowledge about 
the car.  He knows through experience in the profession and may even have information 
on the vehicle’s history.  Today, dealers send signals to potential buyers in the form of 
warranties, guarantees, and “certified pre-owned” inspections which convey the message 
to a buyer that vehicle is not a “lemon.”  Buyers perceive these signals to be “costly 
actions” because the dealer takes time to inspect and money to guarantee the vehicle.  If it 
is not cost-effective for dealers to guarantee “lemons” the guarantee signals a high-
quality car. 
 
3.   Life Insurance Market 
The life insurance market can also be one with asymmetric information, where the 
insurance company is the uninformed party and the customer is the informed party.  
Insurance companies do not know everything about a person’s lifestyle and the potential 
customer may conceal some important information about their lifestyle for fear that they 
will not receive coverage.  The question then becomes, how can insurance companies get 
customers to sort or segment themselves so the company can make a better decision?  
The answer is signaling.  By offering several combinations of premiums and levels of 
coverage, life insurance companies can gain more information about the customer’s 
lifestyle or behavior.  Potential customers who believe they are relatively safe or engage 
in less risky behavior will most likely select a low premium and a lower amount of 
coverage.  Conversely, a customer who has a more risky lifestyle and may engage in 
risky behavior, such as skydiving, will most likely select a high premium and higher 
amount of coverage.  Life insurance companies can use these signals to gather more 
information to aid in their insurance decision, because these signals are “costly actions” 
by the prospective customer. 
                                                 
10 George A. Akerlof.  “The Market for ‘Lemons’:  Quality, Uncertainty, and the Market Mechanism.”  
The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol 84, No. 3, August 1970, 488-500. 
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C. LIMITATIONS OF SIGNALING 
Theorists identify two main problems with signaling theory in markets with 
asymmetric information:  adverse selection and moral hazard.  Signaling theory helps to 
mitigate the effect of each problem in an asymmetric information market, but it does not 
eradicate it altogether. 
 
1.   Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection occurs when the uninformed party must choose from an 
undesirable selection or hidden characteristic in the informed party.  This problem arises 
before the transaction takes place.  The example often used to explain adverse selection 
dilemma is evident in the aforementioned used car market.  Suppose a dealer knows the 
quality of the car, the buyer does not, and the dealer does not disclose this information.  
Furthermore, the buyer is willing to pay $4,000 for a high-quality used car and $1,000 for 
a lemon.  Assuming the buyer has a 50% chance of purchasing either type of car, how 
much would a buyer be willing to pay for a car that has a 50% chance of being a lemon?  
A reasonable assumption would be the average value of these two types of cars, or 
$2,500.11  Potential buyers base their purchasing decision on this average or expected 
value. 
However, as some sellers of high-quality cars choose not to sell them for $2,500, 
there will be fewer high-quality cars offered.  Subsequently, the chance of purchasing a 
high-quality car will decrease and the price will fall.  In a worst case scenario, Akerlof 
postulated the market would collapse, because no high-quality cars would be offered if 
the price drops to $1,000.  Buyers would not be able to purchase high-quality cars and 
dealers would not be able to obtain the true value of a high-quality car.  In other words, 
the uninformed buyer has to choose from an adverse selection (only “lemons”) of the 
dealer’s stock.  It is obvious the market for used cars did not collapse.  Signaling helps 
combat asymmetric information in this market, but does not eliminate it entirely. 
                                                 
11 Arthur O’Sullivan and Steven M. Sheffrin.  Microeconomics:  Principles and Tools.  3rd ed, Upper 
Saddle River, NJ:  Prentice Hall, 2003, 311-325. 
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2.   Moral Hazard 
Signaling does not solve the moral hazard problem created by markets with 
asymmetric information.  This is a problem which occurs after an exchange has taken 
place.  The insurance market is often used to illustrate this problem.  The moral hazard 
occurs when an insured person takes an unobserved or hidden action that affects the 
probability of an event triggering payment by the insurance company.  The simplest 
example is when an insured person participates in reckless driving and this action occurs 
unbeknownst to the insurance company.  This behavior increases the likelihood the 
insured person will be involved in an accident, which is an event that will trigger 
payment from the insurance company.  To mitigate this problem, insurance companies 
require deductibles or co-payments in the event of a loss, but this dilemma persists to 
various degrees in the insurance industry.12 
 
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPLICATIONS 
Just as with job market example outlined at the outset of this chapter, service 
members send signals to the DoD through their education.  In each service, promotion is 
contingent upon successful completion of various educational programs or levels.  Both 
officers and enlisted personnel complete certain professional military education courses 
commensurate with their current rank before advancing to the next.  Additionally, 
enlisted members (and some officers) complete job-specific proficiency qualifications 
throughout the course of their career.  Officers may even complete a graduate level 
program.  Service members who successfully complete these programs send a signal to 
DoD, because they are “costly actions.”  Completing these educational programs requires 
a considerable amount of time, effort, and money on the part of the service members.  
While the services have incorporated these signals into the promotion process, they can 
also use them to make retention and alternative compensation decisions.  Specifically, the 
DoD can read these signals when establishing a reenlistment bonus. 
                                                 
12 Paul G. Keat and Philip K. Y. Young. Managerial Economics:  Economic Tools for Today’s 
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Generally speaking, the field of economics is often viewed as an observational 
science.  Economists develop theories to explain how existing markets act and react in 
certain conditions and create intricate models to test these theories.  However, the 
predictive power of these theories and models can be lacking.  As evident in the previous 
chapters, auction and signaling theories have the advantage of using statistical data and 
the knowledge gained from existing markets, but even naturally occurring data pose 
certain challenges. While econometricians are adept at unraveling the effects of key 
variables of interest, their analysis often can fail to account for “critical tests” of their 
proposed hypotheses, “because distinguishing historical circumstances might occur only 
by chance.”13  Game Theory, a popular field of economic study sparked in the 1970s, 
relies heavily on behavioral assumptions to make predictions.  Concrete data about this 
behavior can be lacking or misleading. 
Experimental economics, just as other observational sciences (i.e. biology and 
chemistry) can overcome the problems associated with naturally occurring data by 
systematically collecting data under controlled laboratory conditions.  Economic 
experiments can be an inexpensive way to study or explain behavior, examine certain 
economic policies, evaluate performance in institutions, and design better economic 
incentives.  Moreover, experimentation can demonstrate how a person might behave 
when faced with an economic choice or identify which economic policies may be 
ineffective in more complex, naturally occurring environments. 
This section discusses several types of economic experiments, design/procedural 
considerations, and why the DoD should conduct experiments.  By marrying auction and 
signaling theory with the results of experimental economics, the DoD can make more 
informed policy decisions. 
                                                 
13 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt.  Experimental Economics.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press, 1993, 3-62. 
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B. TYPES OF EXPERIMENTS 
Only recently has the field of experimental economics become prevalent.  While 
economic theory has a long and distinguished history dating back to the mid-18th century 
in the works of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, experimental economics is a relatively 
recent phenomenon with roots only fifty or sixty years old.  This section is a historical 
analysis of three types of experiments:  market experiments, game experiments, and 
individual decision-making experiments.  Almost all economic experiments can be 
categorized into one or a hybrid of these types. 
 
1.   Market Experiments 
The first type of economic experiment is a market experiment.  In 1948, Edward 
Chamberlin used graduate students as subjects in a simulated version of a natural market 
for one of the first known economic experiments.  In this market, he generated a demand 
and cost structure by dealing the students a deck of playing cards which were marked 
with both values and costs.  The cards were indivisible commodities and could be bought 
or sold.  The cost on each card was the student’s reservation price for this commodity.  If 
they were a buyer, this is the price below which he could profitably buy; if they were a 
seller, this is the price above which he profitably could sell the card.  Through trading, 
students could earn hypothetical earnings in two ways:  they could sell a card and earn 
the difference between the cost and the negotiated price, or they could buy a card and 
earn the difference between the card’s value and the negotiated price.  Students were 
permitted to freely move around the classroom to negotiate, simulating a free and 
unregulated market. 
Running the experiment forty-six times, Chamberlin recorded the buyers’ 
aggregate reservation prices to determine the market’s demand curve and the sellers’ 
aggregate reservation prices formed the market’s supply curve (Figure 1).  He remarked 
that the equilibrium, where price and quantity intersect, in the competitive market “could 
be established unambiguously and controlled by the experimenter (under only the 
assumption that buyers and sellers were willing to trade at the reservation prices 
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established for them in this way).”14  Chamberlin concluded that outcomes systemically 
differed from purely competitive market predictions.  Specifically, he stated that there 
were more transactions than the quantity indicated by the equilibrium. 
 
Figure 1.   Induced Supply and Demand Curves (Chamberlin, 1948) 
 
2.   Game Experiments 
In the 1950s and 1960s, a second type of experiment came into light and remains 
one of the most popular today among business schools, game theorists, and 
psychologists.  The type of experiment is commonly referred to as “prisoner’s dilemma” 
and was first discussed in Albert W. Tucker’s 1950 article, “A Two-person Dilemma.”  
The dilemma is that two people, partners in a crime, are taken into custody, placed in 
separate interrogation rooms and given the opportunity to confess.  For purposes of this 
example, the partners will be labeled Prisoner A and Prisoner B.  If only one prisoner 
confesses, the other prisoner will receive a seven year jail sentence while the confessing 
prisoner will serve only one year as an accessory to the crime and for cooperating with 
the authorities.  If neither prisoner confesses, each will receive a two-year sentence.  If 
both confess, each will serve five-year sentences.  The figure below (Figure 2) 
graphically depicts this scenario with the negative numbers representing the time in 
incarceration and bold text depicts Prisoner B’s possible outcomes. 
                                                 
14 John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, eds.  The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ:  
Princeton University Press, 1995, 14. 
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Figure 2.   The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
Both prisoners would be better off if neither one of them confessed.  Each would 
serve two years.  However, since each prisoner is aware of the other’s incentive to 
confess, both “should” confess.  In 1983, Andrew Coleman ran over 1,500 experiments 
of the prisoner’s dilemma and sociologists continue to study the factors affecting 
collaboration, collusion and defection when people make simultaneous decisions in these 
experiments.15  Economists apply the prisoner’s dilemma to the pricing problem in an 
oligopoly situation or a market with just a few competing firms where collusion can and 
does occur. 
 
3. Individual Decision-Making Experiments 
The third type of experiment focuses on individual behavior in simple situations 
and is the most relevant to the DoD, because they are designed to evaluate the choices 
people make when faced with uncertainty.  The roots of the of choice under uncertainty 
theory came from a work entitled, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by J. von 
Neumann and O. Morgenstern (1944).  Subjects in these experiments make choices 
between “lotteries” or uncertain outcomes.  For example, on the flip of a coin a subject 
would receive $10.00 for heads and $5.00 for tails.  In this experiment, it is clear subjects 
have a 50% chance of receiving $10.00 and a 50% chance of receiving $5.00.  However, 
                                                 
15 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt.  Experimental Economics.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 








(-5, -5) (-1, -7) 
(-7, -1) (-2, -2) 
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the experimenter would then observe whether subjects would accept additional lotteries 
with known outcomes as the probability of receiving these outcomes varied. 
They concluded it is possible to construct a subject’s utility curve or the curve 
denoting their indifference toward risk and return through these experiments and make 
predictions about this curve.  Not all individual choice experiments are related to this 
experiment.  Other experiments have studied human consumption theory, as well as, 
varying degrees of rationality in subjects who were asked to forecast market prices. 
 
C. DESIGNING EXPERIMENTS 
Like experiments in other observational sciences, there are advantages and 
limitations to conducting experiments in a laboratory. The primary advantages a 
laboratory environment offers are replicability and control.  Replicability refers to the 
capacity of others to reconstruct the same experiment to independently verify the results.  
Control refers to the capacity to change laboratory conditions so that observed behavior 
can be used to evaluate alternative theories and policies.16  It is absolutely essential to 
consider these elements when designing economic experiments. 
One disadvantage commonly cited when conducting laboratory economic 
experiments relates to the idea that it is difficult to develop alternative hypotheses when 
examining a primary hypothesis.  Usually, establishing a controlled environment provides 
a test of a particular theory, but testing alternative hypotheses often requires making 
additional assumptions about an individual or market’s behavior. 
This section discusses some common terminology used in experiments, some 
procedural and design considerations in developing experiments and concludes with a 
few “fatal errors” to avoid when conducting experiments. 
                                                 
16 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt.  Experimental Economics.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press, 1993, 3-62. 
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1.   Common Terminology 
Before discussing the intricacies of designing an economic experiment, it is 
important to identify a few terms which are common to many experiments.  These terms 
were taken from Douglas Davis and Charles Holt’s book entitled, Experimental 
Economics.  Similar to observational science experiments, the individuals who participate 
in the experiments are often referred to as subjects.  The people who administer the 
experiment are known as experimenters or proctors.  It is important to note that the 
term “experimenter” usually refers to the person or group of people most responsible for 
all stages of the experiment’s development, its manuscript, its report, etc; the term 
“proctor” refers to the person or group of people that simply administers the experiment, 
but these terms are often used interchangeably.   
Every experiment is based on a number of sessions or rounds.  A session is a 
sequence of decision tasks involving the same groups of subjects on the same day.  
Participants are often gathered and analyzed as a cohort, or a group of subjects that 
participated in a session.  Experiments apply treatment variables.  These are unique 
factors which affect the environment or configuration, such as incentives, experience, 
information and rules.  Applying the same experimental treatment variables to a set of 
sessions is referred to as a cell.  A collection of sessions used to evaluate economic 
propositions in one or more related cells is an experiment. 
 
2.   Procedural and Design Considerations 
Davis and Holt also classify procedural and design considerations for conducting 
economic experiments into categories that are commonly accepted in experimental 
economic literature.  These categories are as follows:  procedural regularity, motivation, 
unbiasedness, calibration, and design parallelism.  This section briefly discusses these 
categories. 
a.   Procedural Regularity 
Procedural regularity focuses on the ability for independent verification 
and the experimenter’s data collection methodology and ability to effectively report the 
results.  The most critical element of an experiment is the final report of analysis.  
Reports should include the set of instructions given to subjects.  Instructions should test a 
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subject’s understanding of the experiment, include criteria for answering questions, 
discuss the nature of incentives, and have a practice run with no reward.  Reports should 
also include:  the subject pool, methods of recruiting, the number and experience level of 
subjects, and a discussion of the physical laboratory environment, location, dates, and 
duration of sessions.  Reports should highlight any procedural deviations in specific 
sessions warranting interpretation and any intentional deception of subject members.  
Standardization is the key to establishing procedural regularity.  Many experiments 
incorporate visually isolated computer terminals or cubicles to present instructions or 
conduct a session. 
 
b.   Motivation 
Another important design consideration is motivation.  Participants should 
receive rewards which correlate to the incentives outlined in the experiment.  Usually 
these rewards are in the form of monetary payments versus hypothetical dollars, because 
providing actual monetary rewards reduces performance variability in the results.17  Prior 
to conducting a session, the experimenter should fully explain the incentive structure in 
the instructions.  To bolster subject recruitment, often economic experiments use 
participation or “sitting” fees in addition to the rewards distributed. 
 
c.   Unbiasedness 
The experiment should not shade subjects to respond in a certain manner.  
It is essential subjects believe that the experimenters are not expecting a certain response 
or that there is a correct answer.  Subjects can perceive suggestive terminology in the 
instructions or incentive structure as subtle behavioral suggestions to respond in a certain 
way.  For example, auctions that bid for abstract good or services are preferred over 
“natural gas permits.”  Biased data collection procedures can easily invalidate a session’s 
results or the entire experiment. 
                                                 
17 Sidney Siegel and D.A. Goldstein.  “Decision-making Behavior in a Two-Choice Uncertain 
Outcome Situation.”  Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. 57, 1959, 37-42. 
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d.   Calibration 
When designing experiments, it critical to have a clear basis of 
comparison.  If a market experiment tests how competitive behavior is altered by a 
treatment variable, such as the market power in the hands of only one seller, then the 
experiment should set a “baseline” condition.  This experiment should begin with a 
baseline condition in which competitive transactions are created in the absence of this 
market power.18  Another aspect of calibration can relate to the choices presented to 
subjects.  Choices should be clearly delineated and understood.  For example, many 
experiments call for subjects to make choices under uncertain conditions.  Subjects have 
a 75% chance of receiving outcome A and 25% chance of receiving outcome B.  In this 
situation, presenting subjects with obtuse probabilities, such as .63 for outcome A and 
.125 for outcome B, is not recommended. 
 
e. Design Parallelism 
The last consideration is design parallelism or the need for experiments to 
accurately reflect naturally occurring economic situations.  Laboratory experiments 
attempt to simplify economic situations.  While they are not mirror images of naturally 
occurring conditions, markets or events, they should relate to these natural settings.  A 
key element of design parallelism relates to the appropriate amount of information 
subjects receive.  For example, auction experiments in which buyers and sellers do not 
know the costs and values of other bidders can provide an excellent way to uncover 
behavioral facts in a realistic environment. 
  
3.   Critical Errors 
Procedural errors in experiments can produce inconsistent results.  Some errors 
can be fatal causing the results to be worthless to the observer or analyst.  Biased or 
incomplete instructions can cripple an experiment.  Failing to use salient financial 
rewards is another critical error.  Some experiments try to test too many variables.   
 
                                                 
18 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt.  Experimental Economics.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press, 1993, 3-62. 
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Experimenters should focus on a few treatments which do not change too many things at 
once.19  Avoiding these common mistakes requires a detailed plan and can be overcome 
prior to the start of the experiment. 
 
D.  WHY SHOULD THE MILITARY CONDUCT EXPERIMENTS? 
The most obvious reason the DoD should conduct economic experiments is cost.  
Experiments are an inexpensive way to make more informed policy decisions.  Although 
the concept of cost has been and continues to be a driving factor in many DoD decisions, 
the current methodology employed by the DoD does not accurately reflect the total cost 
to the military; specifically, the intrinsic costs a service member incurs throughout the 
course of their career.  Identifying intrinsic costs requires the DoD to study humans and 
human behavior.  The primary reason to conduct experiments is because they capture the 
human element. 
While there are countless components to the human element of decision making, 
two of the most important to the DoD are risk aversion and probability estimation.  
Economic experiments that analyze a person’s aversion to risk have limitless applications 
to the military.  The DoD may want to better understand why certain people enter or 
leave the service or volunteer for “risky” career fields.  Economic experiments form a 
bridge between the uncertainty many recruiting models create and the concrete data of 
human behavior.  The second facet of the human element is related to probability 
estimation.  While humans may conceptually understand choices under uncertainty, their 
behavior is not indicative of the uncertainty a situation presents. 
For example, a service member may have a 75% chance of being promoted to the 
next rank.  She may fully understand her chances of promotion, because she knows to 
some extent how she compares to others.  She may be told by her supervisor and chain of 
command that she has 75% chance, she may study the promotion rates of past promotion 
boards, but she may not behave as if she has a 75%.  She may behave as if she had only a 
50% chance of being promoted based on her job performance and productivity.  
Understanding how people behave when faced with uncertainty is extremely valuable to 
                                                 
19 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt.  Experimental Economics.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press, 1993, 3-62. 
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the DoD, because they can make better policy decisions.  With the knowledge, in the 
previous example, the DoD might place a greater emphasis on productivity for 
promotion. 
Besides capturing the human element, economic experiments are another form of 
simulation.  Laboratory experiments create mechanisms in an environment where humans 
make decisions similar to those in the real world.  In 2002, Vernon Smith received the 
Nobel Prize for his work in experimental economics.  He was recognized for developing 
“wind-tunnel tests” for new, alternative markets.  Smith tested the effects of deregulating 
the electricity market in a laboratory before being implemented.  The DoD spends a great 
deal of time and money testing many of its weapon systems.  If the DoD were to embrace 
economic experiments, they could “wind-tunnel test” many policy changes before 
implementing them across the services.  The next chapter of this thesis provides an 
example of one such test. 
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V. APPLYING A SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID EXPERIMENT 
A. BACKGROUND 
Using the procedural and design considerations discussed in the previous section 
as a template, this chapter explains in detail an example of an individual decision-making 
economic experiment for conducting a second-price sealed bid auction.  This section 
incorporates many of the principles and theories discussed in the auction, signaling and 
experimental economics chapters of this thesis.  The entire experiment may be found in 
the appendices (Appendices A-E). 
The purpose of this experiment is to test whether it is possible to find, if presented 
a choice, some unseen dimension which will cause a service member to reveal the value 
each person places on employment outside the military.  The aforementioned choice is 
based on similar choices service members face when presented with retention decisions.  
While this choice in the experiment is not military-specific by design, it is intended to 
simulate the decisions a service member would make under uncertain conditions. 
The experiment has two main parts:  Initial Salary Survey and Second Salary 
Survey.  The next section gives an overview of each part.  In 2007, Dr. Peter Coughlan 
and Dr. William Gates of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy designed this experiment with the assistance of Captain Chandria 
Dietrich, United States Air Force. 
 
1. Initial Salary Survey 
In the first part of the experiment (Appendix A), subjects will make a choice 
under the uncertain employment conditions of Firm A.  Subjects are given a scenario in 
which they are one of one hundred employees working in Firm A.  Their only other 
potential employer is Firm B.  They also have no preference for either firm.  In other 
words, the subject can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to them.  
Additionally, they are told that no matter where they end up working, they will be retiring 
in five years.  Subjects are instructed of their goal; to maximize their total income for the 
next five years. 
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Next, subjects are presented information about their current employer (Firm A) 
and the uncertain employment conditions.  Firm A is going to downsize over the next five 
years and will begin laying off 10% of its workforce or 10 out of the 100 employees.  
Firm A will lay off additional employees in future years, but the exact number is 
uncertain initially.  Also, Firm A will not hire any new employees during these five years.  
Subjects are instructed that if they leave or are laid off from Firm A, there will be no 
opportunity to return to Firm A. 
Firm B has offered to employ anybody who leaves Firm A immediately or in 
future years.  Since Firm B is the only other employment opportunity for the subjects., 
they can leave Firm A now and work for Firm B over the next five years or leave Firm A 
after one, two, three or four years and subsequently work for Firm B for the remainder of 
the five years.  Firm B presents a confidential annual salary offer to each employee of 
Firm A and the subjects do not know the salary amount that Firm B has offered to other 
employees of Firm A.  Subjects do know these salary amounts are spread evenly and 
random across some range, but they do not know the highest or lowest salary (upper and 
lower bounds) in this range.  The example at Appendix A shows the salary offered to one 
subject is $90,000, but this number may be changed or randomized when actually 
conducting the experiment.  Additionally, subjects are told neither Firm A nor Firm B 
will raise or cut salary levels over the subsequent five year period. 
In the last section of the initial salary survey, subjects submit an annual salary 
request to Firm A and receive the rules for submitting it.    Firm A is asking each of its 
100 employees to specify the minimum annual salary each subject would need to receive 
to remain at Firm A.  Firm A will then pay the minimum salary necessary to voluntarily 
retain 90 of its 100 employees for the next year.  In other words, after Firm A collects all 
100 salary requests, it will “lay off” the 10 employees who submitted the highest salary 
requests.  The 10 employees who were laid off will immediately work for Firm B at the 
salary previously offered.  The remaining 90 employees will work at Firm A at least one 
more year and will be paid the same salary, regardless of the amount they requested. 
The remaining 90 employees will be paid the lowest salary which was requested 
among the 10 employees that were laid off.  Restated, Firm A will pay all remaining 
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employees the 10th highest salary requested.  By design, this part of the experiment is 
intended to mirror the procedures of a second-price sealed bid auction where bidders 
submit sealed bids (salary requests) and have no knowledge about the competing bidders.  
In this experiment the bidders are the sellers, selling their labor to a single buyer, Firm A.  
The final step of the initial survey asks subjects to enter their annual salary request. 
 
2.   Second Salary Survey 
After the initial salary survey, subjects receive one of two possible outcomes.  
Either the salary they request is one of the ten highest salaries or the salary they request is 
not one of the ten highest.  If the salary they request is one of the ten highest, then they 
will be directed to the instructions outlined at Appendix B.  These instructions reveal the 
highest and lowest salary requests (upper and lower bounds) of the other employees of 
Firm A and the 10th highest salary request.  Since the subject submitted a salary request 
at or above this amount, the subject (employee) will not be retained by Firm A and will 
receive Firm B’s offer of $90,000 over the next five years.  Thus, their total income is 
$450,000 (5 years X $90,000). 
If the subject’s salary request is not of the ten highest salaries, then they will be 
directed to the instructions at Appendix C.  These instructions also reveal the highest and 
lowest salary requests of the other employees of Firm A and the 10th highest salary 
request.  Because the subject submitted a salary request below this amount, Firm A 
retains the employee for one year. 
In the initial survey, subjects were informed Firm A would make additional lay 
offs in future years.  The second part of the experiment presents another level of 
uncertainty.  The uncertainty stems from the subject’s estimation in the number of 
employees Firm A will lay off in the next four years. To mitigate confusion, subjects are 
provided this estimation.  The sample experiment (Appendix C) instructs subjects that 
they estimate Firm A will lay off 30% of its employees in each of the next four years.  
Conversely, the probability that the subject will be retained in any future year is 70%.  
Additionally, Firm A will randomly select which employees are laid off in future years. 
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Next, subjects receive a set of instructions that assists them in calculating what 
their “expected” annual salary would be using the aforementioned 30% estimate.  
Subjects are given a table with five possible patterns of employment.  Table 1 below 
shows these possibilities. 
 

















       
Probability of Pattern: 30% 21% 15% 10% 24% 
       
Year 1 Employer Firm: A A A A A 
Year 2 Employer Firm: B A A A A 
Year 3 Employer Firm: B B A A A 
Year 4 Employer Firm: B B B A A 
Year 5 Employer Firm: B B B B A 
 
Table 1. Patterns of Employment Using 30% Estimated Workforce Reduction in 
Firm A 
 
While subjects are certain to work for Firm A for at least one year, this table 
shows that there are actually five possible patterns of employment over the next five 
years.  Specifically, subjects can be laid off from Firm A after one, two, three or four 
years, or could remain with Firm A for the entire five year period.  These probability 
patterns correspond to subject’s original estimation that Firm A will be reduced by 30% 
per year over the next five years.  Using these probability patterns, the 10th highest salary 
from Firm A, and the salary previously offered by Firm B, subjects are shown how to 
calculate their expected annual salary, which is a weighted average of their annual salary 
given these probabilities. 
As an alternative to the uncertainty, Firm A will give a five year employment 
guarantee to half (50%) of its retained employees.  To determine which employees will 
be offered this guarantee, Firm A will conduct another salary survey.  This survey will 
determine:  which of the 90 retained employees will be guaranteed employment with 
Firm A for the next five years and the annual salary these 45 people will be paid. 
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In the second survey, Firm A asks each of the 90 retained employees to specify 
the minimum annual salary that he or she would need to receive in order to remain with 
Firm A for the next five years.  After collecting all the 5-year salary requests from its 90 
retained employees, Firm A will give a 5-year employment guarantee to the 45 
employees who submit the lowest 5-year annual salary request.  The 45 employees who 
submit the highest 5-year annual salary request will not receive the guarantee. 
The 45 employees give a 5-year guarantee will each be paid the lowest 5-year 
annual salary requested by the 45 employees not given the guarantee.  In other words, the 
45 employees given a 5-year guarantee will each be paid the 45th highest 5-year annual 
salary request submitted in the second survey.  For those that do not receive the 
guarantee, the terms of employment with Firm A will remain unchanged.  They will work 
at least one year for Firm A.  At this point, subjects submit their 5-year annual salary 
request. 
Just as in the initial salary survey subjects receive one of two possible outcomes.  
Either their second salary request is in/above the 50th percentile (or among the 45 
highest) of salary requests or their request is below the 50th percentile (or among the 45 
lowest) of salary request.  If their request is in/above the 50th percentile, then they will be 
directed to the information contained at Appendix D, which lists the upper and lower 
bounds of the requests submitted and the 45th highest 5-year annual salary request among 
all employees of Firm A.  Subjects are informed that they will not be given one of the 5-
year employment guarantees.  Additionally, subjects receive their total income based on 
one of the five probable patterns of employment.  The experiment can assign these 
patterns randomly. 
If their request is below the 50th percentile, then they will be directed to the 
information contained in Appendix E, which also lists the upper and lower bounds of the 
requests submitted and the 45th highest 5-year annual salary request among all Firm A 
employees.  Since their request is not among the 45 highest 5-year annual salary requests, 
they will be guaranteed employment for the next five years in Firm A.  Additionally, 
subjects receive their total income based on the 45th highest 5-year annual salary request. 
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B. DESIGN AND PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Before conducting this experiment, it is important to consider the procedural and 
design considerations discussed in experimental economic literature.  This section 
explains these areas in detail, but the experimenter should also ensure the overarching 
principles of control and replicability are closely followed.  Developing a clear set of 
instructions in advance will help maintain control in the laboratory environment as well 
as establish a solid basis for others to replicate the experiment. 
 
1. Procedural Regularity 
As the previous chapter noted, standardization is the key to procedural regularity.  
The instructions given to subjects should test a subject’s understanding of the experiment, 
include criteria for answering questions, discuss the nature of incentives and include a 
trial run with no reward.  Any procedural deviations should be noted and thoroughly 
explained.  Establishing procedural regularity does not stop with the instructions.  
Experimenters need to conduct each session in the same manner.  By design the 
experiment should include 21 - 31 rounds.  The one to three rounds would be the trial or 
practice runs without an incentive to tests the subjects’ understanding of the experiment 
without penalty.  In the next two rounds, subjects would be rewarded. 
In the initial salary survey (Appendix A), Firm B offers a confidential salary 
offer.  To prevent subjects from seeing others’ offer or how other subjects may respond 
during the session, this experiment should be conducted in a controlled laboratory 
environment.  This experiment is computer-based.  Therefore, selecting a facility with 
visually isolated computer terminals is important to effectively control the experiment.  
Additionally, the experimenter should arrive before the start of each session to ensure 
subjects do not discuss any aspect of the experiment. 
Experimenters should consider using additional personnel (proctors) to control 
entry into the facility or room.  Proctors can provide subjects instructions which prohibit 
discussion during the session.  Before each session, proctors should collect relevant 
demographic data on each subject.  Since this experiment tests a service member’s 
individual decisions, recording their name, gender, rank, branch of service, number of 
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years in service, and career field (i.e. Military Occupation Specialty, Designator, or Air 
Force Specialty Code) are beneficial to the analysis.  Furthermore, proctors should collect 
each subject’s contact information for additional experiments or verification of responses. 
 
2. Motivation 
This experiment uses “experimental income” as its incentive.  Subjects seek to 
maximize their total experimental income over the five year period.  After their 
responses, their total experimental income is converted into actual earnings at a $100,000 
to $1 exchange rate.  For example, the sample experiment at Appendix B shows the 
subject received $450,000 in total experimental income for the five year period.  This 
subject would receive $4.50 in actual earnings.  While this exchange rate may be adjusted 
based on the experimenter’s budgetary constraints, it is important that subjects receive 
“actual” earnings as opposed to some hypothetical reward.  As noted in the previous 
chapter, a monetary reward reduces variability in the responses and increases a subject’s 
attentiveness during the instructions phase of the session. 
The promise of real money is a strong motivator in this experiment.  However, 
motivation also involves recruiting subjects.  Recruiting efforts should be well publicized 
and advertised to ensure maximum participation.  Experimenters can advertise the fact 
that participants will receive a monetary reward, but should use caution to ensure they do 
not reveal too much information about the experiment.  If recruiting a sufficient number 
of subjects proves challenging, experimenters should consider implementing a sitting or 
participation fee.  If more subjects arrive than the facility can accommodate, proctors 
should ensure potential subjects provide their contact information for future sessions.  
Experimenters can also request subjects sign up in advance. 
Time can also be a motivating factor.  The instructions and advertisements need to 
state approximately how long each session will last.  In its current form, the author 
estimates this experiment will need one hour to complete 21 - 31 sessions; one practice 
round followed by two rounds with monetary rewards.  Future experimenters may need to 




It should be emphasized that at no point do the instructions refer to the survey as 
an auction or refer to the military in any way.  The experiment is intentionally ambiguous 
on these issues to maintain control and not shade subjects to respond in a certain manner.  
Likewise, any advertisement or verbal instructions should be equally ambiguous.  
Additionally, the experiment is gender and rank neutral.  Ideally to obtain the most 
unbiased results, the experiment should be administered to both officers and enlisted 
personnel while not in a military uniform.  Rank on a military uniform can be a 
distraction in a session.  However, if separate sessions are the only means of conducting a 
session, experimenters should note this fact in their report of analysis.  To remain 
unbiased, the sample experiment also intentionally avoids the terms “contracts” or 
“enlistments” so subjects do not respond in a certain way. 
 
4. Calibration 
The most malleable feature of this experiment is how it calibrated.  While subjects 
face some degree of uncertainty in the current experiment, there are additional 
opportunities to test other treatment variables.  For example, in Appendix C subjects are 
provided the calculation for determining their expected annual income.  Additional 
experiments could test whether subjects understand the concept of probability or 
expected income in future years by not providing this information.  Intentionally omitting 
this information creates additional uncertainty.  Future experiments could analyze the 
subjects’ responses with this added uncertainty.  However, experimenters should not 
change too many treatments at once.  The current experiment establishes a base of 
comparison for additional experiments, because it is a relatively simple type of an 
individual decision-making experiment. 
 
5. Design Parallelism 
While this experiment creates a hypothetical economic scenario, a choice between 
staying at Firm A or working for Firm B, the decisions subjects make are quite similar to 
retention decisions military members face today.  Reenlistment eligible service members 
weigh employment in the military against the uncertain probability of working for a 
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civilian firm.  Furthermore, with the United States Navy and Air Force recently facing 
end strength cuts, those service members eligible for involuntary separation face similar 
uncertain retention decisions.  This experiment is one way the DoD can analyze how 
service members make these retention decisions. 
 
C. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Currently, all branches of the armed forces employ various models to selectively 
attract and retain critical skills based on force-shaping needs.  They routinely adjust the 
bonus levels to retain the required number of personnel.  However, these bonus levels 
seldom nominally decline.  Over time, service members perceive these bonuses as part of 
their normal pay and allowances.  While these programs are moderately successful in 
achieving force structure goals through forecasting, they can be fiscally inefficient 
because they do not have a means to determine how much service members would be 
willing to accept to remain in that critical skill.  Everyone is paid an equal amount.  By 
design, the DoD selective reenlistment bonus programs lack the ability for service 
members to signal their intentions and communicate their willingness to continue service.  
Creating a mechanism or means for service member to signal their intentions is essential 
to the DoD’s long-term personnel policy and force structure decisions. 
By itself, an auction to determine the selective reenlistment bonus would 
undoubtedly generate the quantity of service members needed in a particular critical skill.  
However, an auction would not provide any insight as to the quality of service members 
in that critical skill.  Creating a device for service members to signal their intentions will 
give the DoD some insight into the quality of service members.  Separately these theories 
are not beneficial to the DoD.  It is imperative these theories be incorporated together.   
This sample experiment does just that and provides concrete data for analysis 
which the DoD could use before actually conducting an auction of selective reenlistment 
bonuses.  For example, if each of the services publicized (separately) the maximum 
amount they would be willing to pay for labor in a particular critical skill, service 
members would be likely to change their behavior with respect to their bidding strategy.  
Prior to an auction, if the services publicized the number of short and long-term 
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guarantees it was going to offer in a particular critical skill, services members would 
behave differently compared to a situation which offered an unlimited number of long-
term guarantees.  This sample experiment provides the DoD a means to study the human 
element of decision-making.  In other words, it gives the DoD a way to study how and to 
what degree a service member’s behavior changes. 
However, the most important piece of information the DoD can glean from this 
sample experiment is based on the premise that this experiment will cause service 
members to reveal the value they place on employment outside the military.  It is well 
known that service members behave differently among the various branches of the armed 
forces.  Additionally, within each branch, service members with the same critical skills 
behave differently.  They also place different values on their labor in and outside the 
military.  This experiment gives the DoD some insight into the value service members 
place on this labor, because the choice to remain at Firm A is made under uncertain 
conditions.   
Analyzing future economic experiments will help the DoD make a more informed 
decision regarding the implementation of alternative compensation practices.  
Experiments are a powerful means to conduct an inexpensive feasibility study.  If the 
“wind-tunnel” test of a second-price sealed bid auction does not produce the results 
postulated in this thesis, then the DoD should choose not to implement this alternative 
compensation practice.  However, if the DoD is able to gain some insight into the value 
service members place on employment outside the military and subjects signal their 
intentions for continued service, then this experiment is can provide sound data which 
will help in the decision to adopt an alternative compensation practice for the Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus program. 
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APPENDIX A.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 




You are 1 of 100 employees currently working for Firm A. 
Your only other potential employer is Firm B. 
You have no particular preference for Firm A or for Firm B. 
You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you. 
No matter where you end up working, you will be retiring 5 years from now. 
Your only goal for the next 5 years is to maximize your total income over that time span. 
 
Downsizing at Firm A 
Firm A will be downsizing over the next 5 years. 
Firm A will begin by laying off 10% of its workforce immediately (10 out of 100 employees). 
Firm A will lay off additional employees in future years, but the exact number is uncertain at this time. 
Firm A will not be hiring any new employees (or rehiring laid off or departed employees) during this period. 
Thus, if you choose to leave or are laid off from Firm A, there will be no opportunity to return to Firm A in 
later years. 
 
Employment Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has offered to employ anybody who leaves Firm A, whether they leave now or in later years. 
If you leave Firm A now, you will work at Firm B for the next 5 years. 
If you leave Firm A after year 1, 2, 3, or 4, you will work for Firm B for the remainder of the 5 year period. 
This standing offer of employment at Firm B applies whether you leave Firm A voluntarily or are laid off. 
 
Salary Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has presented a confidential annual salary offer to each employee currently working for Firm A. 
The offer presented to each employee represents the annual salary that he/she will receive if employed by 
Firm B. 
Firm B has offered different annual salary amounts to different Firm A employees. 
For each year that you work for Firm B, Firm B has offered to pay you the following annual salary: 
 $90,000  
 
Distribution of Salary Offers from Firm B 
You do not know the salary amounts that Firm B has offered to other current employees at Firm A. 
You know only that all of Firm B's salary offers are spread evenly and randomly over some range. 
In other words, these salary offers are spread evenly & randomly between some lower bound & some upper 
bound. 
You do not know the actual lower and upper bounds of the range of salary offers. 
However, you do know that the salary offered to you by Firm B lies somewhere within this range of offers. 
Thus, it is safe to assume that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are higher than your 
offer above. 
It is also safe to assume that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are lower than your offer. 
 
Future Salary Changes 
Over the next 5 years, each employee's annual salary will only change if he/she changes employers. 
In other words, Firm A will pay you the same annual salary for each year that you work there (no salary 
raises or cuts). 
Similarly, Firm B will pay you the same annual salary for each year that you work there (no salary raises or 
cuts). 
The annual salary that you receive at the two different firms, however, may be different. 
 
Salary Survey at Firm A 
The salary paid to any Firm A employee in previous years will have no influence on his/her future salary at 
Firm A. 
Instead, the annual salary that Firm A will be pay to each of its retained employees will be determined using 
a survey. 
Firm A is asking each of its 100 workers to specify the minimum annual salary that he/she would need to 
receive in order to remain with Firm A. 
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Firm A will then pay the minimum salary necessary to voluntarily retain 90 of its 100 employees for next 
year. 
In particular, after collecting all 100 "salary requests" from its employees, Firm A will lay off the 10 
employees who submitted the highest salary requests. 
Each of the 10 employees laid off will immediately begin working at Firm B at the salary previously offered. 
The remaining 90 employees will work at Firm A for at least one more year. 
All employees retained by Firm A will be paid the same salary, regardless of the salary they requested. 
These retained employees will be paid the lowest salary that was requested among the 10 employees laid 
off. 
In other words, Firm A will pay all retained employees the 10th highest salary requested. 
Note that this salary will be as high or higher than the salary requested by any of the 90 retained employees.  
 
Your Salary Request to Firm A 
You must now decide what annual salary to request from Firm A. 
Remember that if your request is among the highest 10 of the 100 salary requests submitted, you will be laid 
off from Firm A and will work for Firm B for the next 5 years at the salary offer above. 
If your salary request to Firm A is not among the 10 highest, you will continue to work for Firm A for at least 
one more year and will receive an annual salary equal to the lowest salary requested among the 10 
employees not retained. 
What annual salary do you request from Firm A: 
 



























APPENDIX B.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE EXPERIMENT - ABOVE 90TH PERCENTILE 
IF SALARY REQUEST IS ABOVE 90TH PERCENTILE OF THE DISTRIBUTION: 
 
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was: $40,000 
The highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was: $100,000 
The 10th highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its current employees was: $142,466 
 
Your Employer, Salary, and Income for the Next 5 Years 
Your salary request was among the 10 highest requests submitted to Firm A. 
Therefore, you will not be retained by Firm A and will instead be employed by Firm B for the next 5 years. 
Each year, you will receive the annual salary offered to you by Firm B previously. 
Thus, your income over the next 5 years will be as follows: 
 
Year 1: $90,000 
Year 2: $90,000 
Year 3: $90,000 
Year 4: $90,000 




The total above is your experimental earnings for this period. 
This total will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$100,000 of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings 
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APPENDIX C.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE EXPERIMENT - BELOW 90TH 
PERCENTILE 
 
IF SALARY REQUEST IS BELOW 90TH PERCENTILE OF THE DISTRIBUTION 
 
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was: $40,000 
The highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was: $100,000 
The 10th highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its current employees was: $142,466 
Recall that this 10th highest salary request is the lowest request submitted among the 10 employees not 
retained. 
 
Your Employer and Salary for the Next Year 
Your salary request was not among the 10 highest requests submitted to Firm A. 
Therefore, you will be retained by Firm A for the next year. 
Your salary for this first year will be equal to the 10th highest salary request submitted to Firm A as given 
above. 
 
Future Lay Offs at Firm A 
Firm A will continue to reduce the size of its workforce in future years. 
You estimate that Firm A will lay off the following percentage of its employees in each of the next 4 years: 
30% 
Employees laid off from Firm A in future years will be selected at random. 
Thus, the percentage listed above is also the probability that you will be laid off from Firm A in any given 
year. 
Conversely, the probability that you will be retained by Firm A in any future year is equal to: 
70% 
 
Your Employer in Future Years 
Remember that if you are ever laid off from Firm A, you will be immediately employed by Firm B. 
While you are certain to work for Firm A for at least the next year, you actually have 5 different possible 
patterns of employment over the next 5 years. 
In particular, you could be laid off from Firm A after 1, 2, 3, or 4 years, or you could remain with Firm A for 
the entire 5 year period. 
Each of these 5 patterns of employment and its associated probability is illustrated below: 
 

















       
Probability of Pattern: 30% 21% 15% 10% 24% 
       
Year 1 Employer Firm: A A A A A 
Year 2 Employer Firm: B A A A A 
Year 3 Employer Firm: B B A A A 
Year 4 Employer Firm: B B B A A 




Your Salary in Future Years 
Each year that you are employed by Firm B, you will earn the annual salary previously offered to you by 
Firm B. 
Thus, each of the 5 patterns of employment illustrated above has an associated pattern of annual salaries: 
 

















       
Probability of Pattern: 30% 21% 15% 10% 24% 
       
Year 1 Salary: $142,466 $142,466 $142,466 $142,466 $142,466 
Year 2 Salary: $90,000 $142,466 $142,466 $142,466 $142,466 
Year 3 Salary: $90,000 $90,000 $142,466 $142,466 $142,466 
Year 4 Salary: $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 $142,466 $142,466 
Year 5 Salary: $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 $90,000 $142,466 
       
Total 5 Year Income: $502,466 $554,932 $607,398 $659,864 $712,330 
Annual Average: $100,493 $110,986 $121,480 $131,973 $142,466 
 
Your Expected (or Weighted Average) Annual Salary 
As shown above, your average annual salary over the next 5 years could end up being any one of 5 different 
amounts. 
To determine the annual salary you can expect (on average) during this period, you must calculate a 
weighted average. 
 
The weighted average salary is calculated using the following two steps: 
 (1) Multiply each of  the 5 possible annual average salaries by the probability of that particular pattern 
 occurring. 
 (2) Sum these values over all 5 possible employment patterns. 
 
In other words, your weighted average (or expected) annual salary is given by the following formula: 
 
Weighted Average Annual Salary = Prob1 x Avg1 + Prob2 x Avg2 + Prob3 x Avg3 + Prob4 x Avg4 + Prob5 x Avg5 
 
Using the values from the first and last rows of the previous chart, your expected average salary is thus: 
$119,099 
 
Possibility of a 5 Year Employment Guarantee with Firm A 
As noted previously, your employment with Firm A (and the associated salary) is currently guaranteed only 
for 1 year. 
Your employer (and thus, your salary) in later years is uncertain with each possibility analyzed 
mathematically above. 
As an alternative to this uncertainty, Firm A will give a 5 year employment guarantee to half of its retained 
employees. 
 
Another Salary Survey at Firm A 
To determine which employees will be offered 5 year employment, Firm A will conduct another salary 
survey. 
This second survey will be conducted among only those 90 employees retained after the first salary survey. 
This second salary survey will determine: 
 (1) which of the 90 retained employees will be guaranteed employment with Firm A for the next 5 years; 
 (2) the annual salary that will be paid to each of these 5 year employees. 
 
In this second survey, Firm A is asking each of its 90 retained employees to specify the minimum annual 
salary that he/she would need to receive in order to remain with Firm A for the next 5 years. 
Firm A will then determine the minimum 5-year annual salary necessary for 45 of its 90 retained employees 
to voluntarily remain with Firm A for 5 years. 
45 
In particular, after collecting all the 5-year salary requests from its 90 retained employees, Firm A will give a 
5 year guarantee of employment to the 45 employees who submitted the lowest 5-year annual salary 
requests. 
The remaining 45 employees (those who submit the highest 5-year annual salary requests) will not receive a 
5 year guarantee of employment. 
The 45 employees given a 5 year guarantee of employment will each be paid the lowest 5-year annual 
salary that was requested among the 45 employees not given a 5 year employment guarantee.  
In other words, the 45 employees given a 5 year guarantee of employment will each be paid the 45th 
highest 5-year annual salary request that was submitted in the second salary survey.  
For the 45 employees not guaranteed 5 year employment, the terms of employment with Firm A will remain 
unchanged. 
In your case this means that if you are not guaranteed 5 year employment with Firm A: 
 (1) You will still be guaranteed employment with Firm A for at least 1 year. 
 (2) The probability that they will be laid off from Firm A in any year after the first is still equal to:  30% 
 (3) Your annual salary during any year that you are employed by Firm A will still be equal to:  $142,466 
 (4) If you ever laid off from Firm A, you will be employed by Firm B for the remainder of the 5 year period. 
 (5) Your annual salary during any year that you are employed by Firm B will still be equal to:  $90,000 
 
Your Second Salary Request to Firm A 
You must now decide what 5-year guaranteed annual salary to request from Firm A. 
 
Remember that if your request is among the highest 45 of the 90 salary requests submitted, you will be laid 
off from Firm A and will work for Firm B for the next 5 years at the salary offer above. 
Remember that if your 5-year annual salary request is among the lowest 45 requests in this second survey: 
 (1) You are guaranteed to work for Firm A for 5 years. 
 (2) You will be paid the 45th highest 5-year annual salary requested in this second survey.  
 
If your salary request to Firm A is not among the 45 lowest, you will receive the previously determined 
annual salary for as long as you work for Firm A, but you will only be guaranteed employment at Firm A for 
the first year. 
 
 What 5-year guaranteed annual salary do you request from Firm A: 
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APPENDIX D.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE EXPERIMENT SECOND SALARY SURVEY 
– ABOVE 50TH PERCENTILE 
 
IF SECOND SALARY REQUEST IS ABOVE 50TH PERCENTILE OF THE NEW DISTRIBUTION: 
 
Distribution of New Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest 5-year annual salary request submitted among the other Firm A employees was: $40,000 
The highest 5-year annual salary request submitted among the other Firm A employees was: $100,000 
The 45th highest 5-year annual salary request submitted among all Firm A employees was: $130,867 
 
Your Terms of Employment for the Next 5 Years 
Your salary request was among the 45 highest requests submitted to Firm A. 
Therefore, you will not be given a 5 year guarantee of employment with Firm A. 
Instead, you are only guaranteed to work for Firm A for one year. 
At the end of each year with Firm A, the probability that you are laid off from Firm A is equal to:  30% 
If you are ever laid off from Firm A, you will work for Firm B for the remainder of the 5 year period. 
Each year that you work for Firm A, your annual salary will be:    $142,466 
Each year that you work for Firm B, your annual salary will be:    $90,000 
 
Your Actual Employer, Salary, and Income for the Next 5 Years 
In this section, your employer and salary for each of the next 5 years is determined based on the probability 
of being laid off from Firm A each year. 
Your actual employer in each of the next 5 years is as follows: 
 
Year 1: FIRM A 
Year 2: FIRM A 
Year 3: FIRM B 
Year 4: FIRM B 
Year 5: FIRM B 
 
Thus, your annual salary and total income over the next 5 years is as follows: 
 
Year 1: $142,466 
Year 2: $142,466 
Year 3: $90,000 
Year 4: $90,000 





The total above is your experimental earnings for this period. 
This total will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$100,000 of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings 
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APPENDIX E.  SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE EXPERIMENT SECOND SALARY SURVEY 
– BELOW 50TH PERCENTILE 
 
IF SALARY REQUEST IS BELOW 50TH PERCENTILE OF THE NEW DISTRIBUTION: 
 
Distribution of New Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest 5-year annual salary request submitted among the other Firm A employees was: $40,000 
The highest 5-year annual salary request submitted among the other Firm A employees was: $100,000 
The 45th highest 5-year annual salary request submitted among all Firm A employees was: $129,517 
 
Your Employer, Salary, and Income for the Next 5 Years 
Your salary request was among the 45 lowest requests submitted to Firm A. 
Therefore, you will be guaranteed employment with Firm A for the next 5 years. 
Each year, you will receive the 45th highest annual salary requested in the second survey which is indicated 
above. 
Thus, your income over the next 5 years will be as follows: 
 
Year 1: $129,517 
Year 2: $129,517 
Year 3: $129,517 
Year 4: $129,517 




The total above is your experimental earnings for this period. 
This total will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$100,000 of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings 
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